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WHAT EXACTLY IS MARKET INTEGRITY? AN 
ANALYSIS OF ONE OF THE CORE OBJECTIVES OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION 
JANET AUSTIN 
ABSTRACT 
One of the main objectives of securities regulation around the 
world is to protect the integrity or fairness of the markets. This, 
together with protecting investors, improving the efficiency of mar-
kets, and protecting the markets from systemic risk, form the four 
fundamental goals of securities regulation. 
However, what exactly is envisaged by this concept of market 
integrity or fairness? Are these simply norms of behaviour incapa-
ble of further definition? Despite their importance, relatively little 
attention has been given to these concepts in the literature. Do they, 
for example, require securities regulators to just work towards 
eliminating dishonest trading practices such as market manipu-
lation and insider trading? Or should regulators be required to go 
further and ensure, for example, transparency of corporate infor-
mation, transparency of price information, and equality of access 
to the markets? 
Examining what is encompassed by the objectives of protecting 
market integrity and fairness is critical for a number of reasons. 
First, if they are only normative concepts, they may be incapable 
of measurement. This is problematic because it may be impossible 
to assess the progress of securities regulators towards achieving 
these goals. In addition, if they are in fact incapable of further def-
inition and measurement, then innovations which improve market 
efficiency, another key goal of securities regulation, are likely to be 
permitted even if the innovation in question actually detracts from 
the fairness or integrity of the market. This is because improvements 
in market efficiency are generally quantifiable, and, therefore, mea-
sured improvements in market efficiency create the momentum for 
those improvements to be permitted. 
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This Article seeks to analyse the concepts of market integrity 
and market fairness. It examines how they became one of the core 
goals of securities regulation around the world. The Article then 
attempts to break down these concepts and provide further definition 
of them. It is hoped that this analysis will encourage the develop-
ment of metrics that assess securities regulators’ performance, as 
well as enable the assessment of whether or not new market inno-
vations should be adopted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Protecting the integrity or the fairness of the markets for se-
curities is one of the key justifications for having securities regu-
lators and securities regulation in the first place.1 For example, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) stated mission is “to 
protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, 
and facilitate capital formation.”2 Similarly, in Canada, the stated 
purpose of the Ontario Securities Act3 includes “foster[ing] fair 
and efficient capital markets and confidence in capital markets.”4 
The objectives of Germany’s Securities Regulator, Bundesanstalt 
für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (commonly known by its abbre-
viation “BaFin”)5 is “to ensure the transparency and integrity of 
the financial market and the protection of investors.”6 
The Oxford Dictionary defines fairness as “honesty, impartial-
ity, fair dealing.”7 Integrity is defined in the Oxford Dictionary in 
a number of ways, namely: 
(1) The condition of having no part or element taken away or 
lacking; undivided state; completeness. 
(2) The condition of not being marred or violated; unimpaired 
or uncorrupted condition; original perfect state; soundness. 
(3) (a) Freedom from moral corruption; innocence, sinlessness 
(b) Soundness of moral principle; the character of uncor-
rupted virtue; uprightness, honesty, sincerity.8 
                                                                                                            
1 See About the SEC, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov 
/about/whatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/J5VT-FJPP]. 
2 Id. 
3 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.) [hereinafter Canada Securities Act]. 
4 See id. § 1.1. 
5 See generally Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht [BaFin] 
[Act Establishing the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority], Apr. 22, 2002, 
FinDAG I at 1310, last amended Dec. 6, 2011 FinDAG I at 2481, art. 19 (Ger.), http:// 
www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Aufsichtsrecht/Gesetz/find 
ag_aktuell_en.html [https://perma.cc/5PFW-XUD9]. 
6 Securities Supervision, BAFIN (Oct. 17, 2003), http://www.bafin.de/EN/Die 
BaFin/AufgabenGeschichte/Wertpapieraufsicht/wertpapieraufsicht_node_en 
.html [https://perma.cc/FD6R-HRQQ]. 
7 Fairness, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (6th ed. 2007). 
8 Integrity, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (6th ed. 2007). 
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With these definitions blending concepts of morality and hon-
esty, “fairness” and “integrity” seem to be informal norms of be-
haviour, reflective perhaps of one’s own individual assessment of 
what is honest or moral.9 
However, these concepts of integrity and fairness are not used 
by securities regulators in isolation.10 They are qualified in that 
they are used in the context of constituting an achievable charac-
teristic of a market for securities.11 Accordingly, it seems that in-
tegrity in this context can be confined to ensuring that markets 
are “unimpaired,” “uncorrupted,” and “sound,” while fairness can 
be confined to ensuring that the markets have the characteristics 
of being impartial and equitable.12 
Even contextualised in this way, it may be that the concepts 
are still normative. Indeed, some have criticised the concept of 
market fairness as being too vague and devoid of principled con-
tent.13 However, governments, securities regulators, and even the 
G20 have adopted market integrity and market fairness as a core 
objective for securities regulation.14 As such, it seems that these 
concepts should be capable of interpretation, predictability or, at 
least, contain within them some principles of general application. 
In addition, consigning these concepts to the relatively vague 
status of being informal norms of understanding that govern the 
behaviour of individuals in society is problematic for a number of 
reasons. First, as they are one of the core objectives of securities 
regulation and one that securities regulators themselves strive to 
                                                                                                            
9 For an attempt to develop a non-normative meaning of integrity in relation 
to individuals and organizations see Werner Erhard & Michael C. Jensen, Put-
ting Integrity Into Finance: A Purely Positive Approach 3 (Harv. Bus. Sch. 
NOM, Unit Research Paper No. 12-074; European Corp. Governance Inst. 
(ECGI), No. 417/2014; Barb. Grp., Working Paper No. 12-01, 2015), http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=1985594 [https://perma.cc/ZJP5-ENZC]. 
10 Id. at 3. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 4, 67. 
13 See generally Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. BUS 
L. REV. 119 (2002). 
14 The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 11–12, 
2010), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/G20COMMUN1110.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/453C-PCUU] (calling on IOSCO to make recommendations “to 
promote markets’ integrity and efficiency to mitigate the risks posed to the 
financial system by the latest technological developments”). 
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achieve, how can anyone, including the regulators themselves, mea-
sure or assess their progress towards achieving this goal?15 Does 
it also mean that securities regulators can intervene in the markets 
with little or no justification except a bold assertion that a partic-
ular practice may be “unfair”? 
Furthermore, if these concepts are incapable of further definition 
and measurement, innovations which improve market efficiency, 
another key goal of securities regulators, are likely to be permit-
ted even if the practice may detract from what some may view as 
the integrity or fairness of the markets.16 This is because improve-
ments in market efficiency can usually be measured.17 For in-
stance, an innovation in the structure of a securities market may 
show a measurable reduction of the spread between the price at 
which securities are offered for sale and the price at which the 
same securities are offered for purchase.18 This reduction of the 
buy-ask spread, referred to as an improvement in liquidity,19 en-
hances the efficiency of the market because it makes it more likely 
that a trade will take place.20 Innovations that create efficiency 
gains are likely to trump indefinite assertions of market unfair-
ness because they can be measured.21 For example, recently there 
has been controversy over whether securities regulators should 
intervene to prohibit high frequency traders being able to co-locate 
their computer servers with those of the exchanges.22 This is a 
practice that can be shown to improve liquidity and, therefore, 
market efficiency, but that also seems to create an inequitable 
                                                                                                            
15 See About the SEC, supra note 1; see also Securities Supervision, supra 
note 6; see generally Canada Securities Act, supra note 3. 
16 See Erhard & Jensen, supra note 9, at 5–6. 
17 See Alex Frino, Vito Mollica & Robert I. Webb, The Impact of Co-Location 
of Securities Exchanges’ and Traders’ Computer Servers on Market Liquidity, 
34 J. OF FUTURES MKTS. 20, 26–27 (2014). 
18 Id. at 27. 
19 Id. at 28. 
20 Id. at 28, 31. 
21 See Janet Austin, Protecting Market Integrity in an Era of Fragmentation 
and Cross-Border Trading, 46 OTTAWA L. REV. 25, 27–29 (2014–15). 
22 See Scott Patterson, Hill Peers Into Market’s Fast Lane, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 20, 2012, at C4; Geoffrey Rogrow, Colocation: The Root of All High-Frequency 
Trading Evil?, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Sept. 20, 2012, 1:57 PM), http://blogs.wsj 
.com/marketbeat/2012/09/20/collocation-the-root-of-all-high-frequency-trading 
-evil/ [https://perma.cc/5DBU-JQ39].  
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playing field because as a result of such co-location some traders 
get market information a split second before other traders.23 
The aim of this Article then, is to attempt to tease out what is 
incorporated within these concepts of market integrity and mar-
ket fairness and to differentiate them from other key goals, 
namely market efficiency and investor protection.24 It is hoped 
thereafter that further research can gradually develop metrics to 
determine the impact of new innovations on market integrity and 
fairness. Part I of this Article traces how market integrity and 
market fairness became a key goal of securities regulation. Part II 
moves on to survey how this goal is incorporated within the other 
goals of securities regulators of five countries, namely the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Australia, 
which represent over 50 percent of the world’s securities mar-
kets.25 Part III examines how these terms have been defined in 
the existing literature. Drawing upon this examination, Part IV 
delineates some of the core attributes contained within the mar-
ket integrity and market fairness requirements. The article con-
cludes by calling for more research to measure these elements to 
better enable regulators to assess the impact of changes to secu-
rities regulation. 
I. HOW MARKET INTEGRITY AND MARKET FAIRNESS BECAME A KEY 
GOAL OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
Market fairness seems to have started its course to becoming 
one of the key objectives of securities regulation around the world 
                                                                                                            
23 See Frino et al., supra note 17, at 31 (finding that allowing traders to co-
locate their computer servers with those of the Australian Securities Exchange 
resulted in increased liquidity as measured by a narrowing of bid-ask spreads 
and market depth); see also Patterson, supra note 22, at C1; Rogrow, supra 
note 22. 
24 See About the SEC, supra note 1. 
25 All of these jurisdictions are in the top twelve in the world in terms of 
market capitalization. Market capitalization of listed domestic companies, 
WORLD BANK, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.4 [https://perma.cc/T6K7-M74A] 
(specifically, in 2015 the United States made up 40.6 percent of the world mar-
kets in terms of market capitalization, the United Kingdom 3 percent, Canada 
2.6 percent, Germany 2.8 percent, and Australia 2 percent (the United King-
dom figures reflect 2010 estimations)). 
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as a result of the enacting of the Securities Exchange Act26 (Ex-
change Act) in the United States in 1934.27 
The original text of the Exchange Act sets out the necessity for 
the establishment of the Securities Exchange Commission and the 
regulation of the exchanges and brokers.28 Section 2(a) of that Act 
provided that regulation was necessary because transactions con-
ducted on exchanges and over-the-counter markets are effected with 
“a national public interest.”29 This provision states that regula-
tion is necessary: “in order to protect interstate commerce, the 
national credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect and make 
more effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve 
System, and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets 
in such transactions.”30  
The Act goes on to explain that regulation is necessary because 
securities transactions and the prices of securities directly influence 
the financing of interstate trade, international trade, and industry.31 
The price of securities also affects bank loans when securities are 
used as collateral.32 Furthermore, manipulation, speculation, and 
unreasonable fluctuations of the price of securities adversely af-
fect the volume of credit available to trade and industry.33 This in 
turn impacts upon the level of unemployment, and increases in 
unemployment burden the Federal Government.34 To this day, the 
justifications for the Exchange Act largely remain unchanged.35 
                                                                                                            
26 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 
(1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934)). 
27 See About the SEC, supra note 1. 
28 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2. 
29 Id.  
30 Id. (emphasis added). 
31 Id. § 2(1). 
32 Id. § 2(2). 
33 Id. § 2(3). 
34 Id. § 2(4). 
35 In 1975, the objects were amended to add the words “to remove impedi-
ments to and perfect the mechanisms of a national market system for securities 
and a national system for the clearance and settlement of securities transac-
tions and the safeguarding of securities and funds related thereto,” before the 
words “and to impose requirements necessary to make such regulation and 
control reasonably complete and effective.” See Securities Act Amendments of 
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 2, 89 Stat. 97 (1975). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act also changed the word “affected” to “effected.” 
See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 985(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1933 (2010). 
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Although this explanation of the need for regulation could be 
read as merely setting out the constitutional underpinning for the 
U.S. federal government to act, the objects of the Exchange Act 
and the associated Securities Act36 reflect the historical impetus 
for regulation at the time. These Acts were a key part of the so-
called “New Deal” legislation enacted in response to the stock 
market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed.37 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress had two key con-
cerns that necessitated this legislation. First, investors had been 
cheated because of market abuse; namely, there had been wide-
spread manipulation of stocks in the markets.38 Second, the Great 
Depression had been exacerbated by a lack of investor confidence 
in terms of returning to the markets after the crash, thereby, hin-
dering the capacity of corporations to raise capital.39 
Following the lead of the United States, during the latter part 
of the 20th century, other countries also adopted market fairness 
as a key objective of securities regulation.40 Today, market fair-
ness is promulgated as a key objective of securities regulation via 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO).41 IOSCO’s main policy statement, the Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation, sets out the objectives for se-
curities regulation as: 
x protecting investors; 
                                                                                                            
36 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1933). 
37 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES 
AND MATERIALS 2 (11th ed. 2009). 
38 The House Report accompanying the Securities Act of 1933 examined the 
decade after World War I and concluded: “Fully half or $25,000,000 worth of 
securities floated during this period have been proved to be worthless. These 
cold figures spell tragedy in the lives of thousands of individuals who invested 
their life savings, accumulated after years of effort, in these worthless securi-
ties.” Id. at 2 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933)). 
39 See id. 
40 For Japan in 1948 see Kin’yū shōhin torihiki-hō [Financial Instruments 
and Exchange Act], Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 1, http://www.fsa.go.jp/common 
/law/fie01.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3K5-3QPU] (Japan). For Ontario, Canada, in 
1994, see Securities Amendment Act, S.O. 1994, c. 33, s. 2 (Can.). 
41 INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 3 (2010), http://iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/BX34-ES35].  
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x ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and trans-
parent; and  
x reducing systemic risk.42 
The document also sets out thirty-eight principles which it states 
are based upon the three abovementioned objectives, though it does 
not state how each of the principles relates to each of the objectives.43 
This key IOSCO policy statement, originally formulated in 
1998, appears to be heavily influenced by U.S. securities regulators.44 
This is because IOSCO itself was formed in 1983 from an inter-
American regional organization and, until recently, its governance 
structure was biased towards regulators from North America.45 
In fact, Kal Raustiala has argued that organizations such as IOSCO 
are essentially exploited by the SEC to spread the “regulatory gos-
pel” of U.S. securities law.46 
IOSCO’s membership has grown and its members now cover 
115 jurisdictions representing over 95 percent of the world’s secu-
rities markets.47 Since 2012, it has been governed by a board more 
reflective of this diverse membership.48 Nevertheless, its core policy 
                                                                                                            
42 Id. These goals may conflict, which could cause difficulty in deciding on a 
regulatory solution. See generally Chester S. Spatt, Regulatory Conflict: Mar-
ket Integrity vs. Financial Stability, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 625 (2010). 
43 See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, supra note 41, at 3. 
44 Janet Austin, The Power and Influence of IOSCO in Formulating and 
Enforcing Securities Regulations, 15 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 1, 14 
(2015); compare INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, supra note 41, at 1 (“IOSCO’s cur-
rent goals and priorities are first to identify and address systemic risks to the 
fair and efficient functioning of markets.”), with About the SEC, supra note 1 
(“The mission of the [SEC] is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and 
efficient markets.”).  
45 Austin, supra note 44, at 3. 
46 Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgov-
ernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 
32 (2002). 
47 About IOSCO, IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=about_iosco 
[https://perma.cc/W33E-9RUC].  
48 In 2012, IOSCO changed its governing structure to a governing Board. 
The governing Board consists of thirty-six members, eighteen of which are from 
the countries with the largest markets. IOSCO, RESOLUTION OF THE PRESIDENTS’ 
COMMITTEE ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE IOSCO BOARD, 1–3 (2013), http:// 
www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES49.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC3X 
-6DUJ]. The other members consist of the Chair and Vice Chair of the Growth 
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document, the Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, 
largely remains unchanged.49 
IOSCO’s mission is to be the global standard setter of securi-
ties regulation, and IOSCO members have resolved to implement 
and adhere to consistent standards of regulation.50 Part of IOSCO’s 
strategy to achieve these consistent standards has been an eval-
uation process that tracks the level of implementation of the 
IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation by each 
country.51 Initially, IOSCO instigated this process by way of a 
self-assessment exercise.52 However, in 2011 IOSCO established 
an Assessment Committee to accelerate this evaluation exercise.53 
IOSCO envisages the assessment process as key to working to-
wards harmonization and has stated that it is designed to identify 
                                                                                                            
and Emerging Markets Committee, the Chairs of the four Regional Committees, 
two members elected by the Growth and Emerging Markets Committee and two 
members elected by each of the four Regional Committees. Id.  
49 Compare INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION (1998), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOS 
COPD82.pdf [https://perma.cc/TNQ3-9XRU], with INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, 
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION (2003), https://www 
.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA2W-ZFSN]. 
In 2010, several principles were added as a result of the 2008 global financial 
crisis. See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, supra note 41, at 3. 
50 See About IOSCO, supra note 47.  
51 See generally INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IOSCO OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION (2013), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD359 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z3M-L6WK] [hereinafter IOSCO 2013 METHOD] (guid-
ing a self-assessment on the implementation level of IOSCO’s principles). This 
2013 methodology replaced INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, METHODOLOGY FOR 
ASSESSING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IOSCO OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION (2003), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOS 
COPD155.pdf [https://perma.cc/2US7-QVF8]. 
52 This self-assessment exercise asked each member to answer a list of ques-
tions in relation to each principle and to reach a conclusion as to whether the 
principle was fully implemented, broadly implemented, partly implemented, or 
not implemented. See IOSCO 2013 METHOD, supra note 51, at 14, 18–19. Al-
ternatively, a member could elect to have the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) assess its compliance through what is called its Financial Sector Assess-
ment Program. Id. at 14; see also The Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP), IMF (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/fsap 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CE7-FYKF]. 
53 See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N ANNUAL REPORT 2011, 44 (2011), http:// 
iosco.org/annual_reports/2011/ [https://perma.cc/5VQW-AKKQ]. 
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“potential gaps, inconsistencies, weaknesses, and areas where 
further powers or authorities may be necessary, and as a basis for 
framing priorities for enhancements or reforms to existing laws, 
rules, and procedures.”54 
IOSCO therefore expects that once a member identifies gaps 
in its framework of securities regulation, it will take steps to 
adopt new laws to bring its securities regulation into line with 
IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles.55 It seems then that over time 
it is likely that more regulators will adopt market fairness or what 
seems to be its equivalent, market integrity, as a key goal for their 
securities regulation.56 
According to IOSCO, fairness is a broad concept, incorporating 
not only the elimination of dishonest practices but also encom-
passing a need to promote equal access to markets: 
The fairness of the markets is closely linked to investor protec-
tion and, in particular, to the prevention of improper trading 
practices. Market structures should not unduly favor some 
market users over others. The regulator’s approval of exchange 
and trading system operators and of trading rules helps to en-
sure fair markets. 
 
Regulation should detect, deter, and penalize market manipu-
lation and other unfair trading practices. Regulation should 
aim to ensure that investors are given fair access to market 
facilities and market or price information. Regulation should 
also promote market practices that ensure fair treatment of or-
ders and a price formation process that is reliable.57 
II. HOW MARKET INTEGRITY AND MARKET FAIRNESS 
ARE INCORPORATED WITHIN THE GOALS OF 
FIVE SECURITIES REGULATORS 
Although IOSCO is encouraging the adoption of market fairness 
as a key goal, some countries, as demonstrated below, have placed 
the emphasis on what seems to be a very similar concept, market 
                                                                                                            
54 IOSCO 2013 METHOD, supra note 51, at 15. 
55 Id. at 21, 24.  
56 Id. at 11–13. 
57 Id. at 11. 
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integrity.58 Others stress the importance of the related concept of 
market confidence.59 
In the United States context, market fairness is the goal and 
this is reflected in the wording of the Exchange Act.60 As such, the 
SEC states that its mission is “to protect investors, maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”61 
The Exchange Act, focused on the secondary markets, as originally 
enacted had four basic purposes. First, it was to regulate the mar-
kets.62 Second, it was to protect investors through disclosure.63 
Third, it was to prevent and provide remedies for manipulation 
and fraud in the markets.64 Finally, it was designed to control the 
amount of the nation’s credit that goes into the markets.65 
In Canada, each province currently has a separate securities 
act.66 In some provinces the goal of fostering market “fairness” is 
clearly set out. For example, in Ontario, the purposes of the Ontario 
Securities Act are: “(a) to provide protection to investors from un-
fair, improper or fraudulent practices; and (b) to foster fair and 
efficient capital markets and confidence in capital markets.”67 
The Ontario Securities Commission, which administers and en-
forces this Act, is directed by the Act on how to achieve market 
                                                                                                            
58 See, e.g., About the FCA, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (June 12, 2016), https:// 
www.the-fca.org.uk/about/the-fca [https://perma.cc/YFY8-6JC8]; Securities Su-
pervision, BAFIN (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.bafin.de/EN/DieBaFin/Aufgaben 
Geschichte/Wertpapieraufsicht/wertpapieraufsicht_node_en.html [https://perma 
.cc/KR4K-GEQW].  
59 See, e.g., Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 § 1.1 (Can.). 
60 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 1, 48 Stat. 881, 
881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934)) (“[T]o prevent inequitable and 
unfair practices on such exchanges and markets”). 
61 Investor’s Advocate, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www 
.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/VKM8-VTLZ]. 
62 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 226 (3d ed. 1989). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Although this may change soon as some provinces move towards adopting 
a uniform Securities Act, to be called the Capital Markets Act. See The Coop-
erative Capital Markets Regulatory System, COOP. CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATORY 
SYS., http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/about/ [https://perma.cc/2SX6-27EB]. 
67 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5. § 1.1 (Can.) 
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fairness. It is directed to set requirements for timely, accurate and 
efficient disclosure of information, to restrict fraudulent and un-
fair market practices and procedures, and to set requirements for 
the maintenance of high standards of fitness and business con-
duct in order to ensure honest and responsible conduct by market 
participants.68 
In contrast, the British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) 
does not have a specific objective of market fairness or market 
integrity incorporated within its Securities Act.69 Nevertheless, it 
has determined that its mission is “to protect and promote the pub-
lic interest by fostering … a securities market that is fair and war-
rants public confidence and … a dynamic and competitive securities 
industry that provides investment opportunities and access to 
capital.”70 
In Australia, the Australian Securities and Investment Com-
mission Act (ASIC Act) provides that the securities regulator, the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), must 
exercise its power to, inter alia, “(a) maintain, facilitate and im-
prove the performance of the financial system and the entities 
within that system in the interests of commercial certainty, re-
ducing business costs, and the efficiency and development of the 
economy; and (b) promote the confident and informed participation 
of investors and consumers in the financial system.”71 The empha-
sis seems then to be on market confidence and ASIC has interpreted 
this provision such that one of its strategic objectives is “[p]romoting 
investor and financial consumer trust and confidence.”72 Never-
theless, despite no mention of fairness within the ASIC Act, ASIC 
states that another strategic objective is “ensuring fair, orderly 
and transparent markets.”73 
                                                                                                            
68 Id. § 2.1. 
69 See generally Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418 (Can.). 
70 B.C. SEC. COMM’N, GOVERNANCE POLICY 4 (May 5, 2016), http://www 
.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/About_Us/Who_We_Are/Governance/Governance_Policy 
_May_16_2016.pdf?t=1466530708894 [https://perma.cc/M6XN-BR47]. 
71 Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2) 
(Austl.). 
72 Our Role, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, (Apr. 20, 2016), http://asic.gov.au 
/about-asic/what-we-do/our-role/#priorities [https://perma.cc/75EQ-WZRE]. 
73 Id. 
 
2017] WHAT EXACTLY IS MARKET INTEGRITY? 229 
The Act administered by the securities regulator for the United 
Kingdom, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), requires it to 
work towards maintaining market confidence, maintaining finan-
cial stability, protecting consumers, and reducing financial crime.74 
The FCA states that “[f]inancial markets need to be honest, fair, 
and effective so that consumers get a fair deal.”75 It states that its 
operational objectives are to “[p]rotect consumers ... protect and 
enhance the integrity of the U.K. financial system ... [and] [p]ro-
mote competition.”76 
Germany’s securities regulator, BaFin, frames its objectives as 
“to ensure the transparency and integrity of the financial market 
and the protection of investors.”77 Specifically, the Act that BaFin 
administers and enforces gives BaFin wide powers.78 This includes 
the power to issue orders that are appropriate and necessary to 
eliminate or prevent undesirable developments that may be det-
rimental to the stability of financial markets or undermine confi-
dence in the proper functioning of financial markets.79 
It seems therefore that while some regulators set the goal as 
market fairness, for others the goal is market integrity or even 
market confidence.80 There also seems to be a degree of fluidity 
between regulators in declaring that their mission is to promote 
market fairness, market integrity, or market confidence even if 
they are not specifically directed by law to consider these concepts 
while exercising the powers vested in the governing legislation.81 
The securities regulators referred to above also do not specifically 
explain what is meant by market integrity, market confidence, 
                                                                                                            
74 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8, § 2 (U.K.). 
75 See About the FCA, supra note 58. 
76 Id. 
77 See Securities Supervision, supra note 6. 
78 See, e.g., Wertpapierhandelsgesetz—WpHG [Securities Trading Act], 
Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL I at 2708, last amended by Gesetz [G], June 22, 2011, BGBL I 
at 1126, art. 3, § 4(a) (Ger.), https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlich 
ungen/EN/Aufsichtsrecht/Gesetz/WpHG_en.html [https://perma.cc/WUS8-JN9X]. 
79 Id. 
80 Compare Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5. (Can.) with Australian Secu-
rities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2) (Austl.), and About the 
FCA, supra note 58. 
81 See, e.g., Our Role, supra note 72; Securities Act R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418 (Can.). 
 
230 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:215 
and market fairness.82 This may be because the regulator views the 
concept as normative.83 Alternatively, it may be deliberate in order 
to give regulators the flexibility to tackle a wide range of problems 
under an umbrella of market fairness/market integrity/market 
confidence. Of course, such flexibility is advantageous as it would en-
able regulators to easily justify that many issues fall within their 
domain. However, leaving these concepts fluid is also problematic 
because it makes the measurement of a given regulators’ progress 
towards achieving these goals uncertain. It also gives rise to the 
possibility of allegations of regulatory overreach.84 
What perhaps is clear is that the regulators view the goals as 
being similar and the concepts of market fairness, market integrity, 
and market confidence as being intertwined.85 This is consistent 
with IOSCO’s definition of market fairness referred to above and 
a definition given by IOSCO’s Technical Committee of market in-
tegrity in 2011.86 In this report, the Committee defined market 
integrity as: “the extent to which a market operates in a manner 
that is, and is perceived to be, fair and orderly and where effective 
rules are in place and enforced by regulators so that confidence 
and participation in the market is fostered.”87 
                                                                                                            
82 See, e.g. Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.); About the FCA, supra 
note 58; Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 
12BG (Austl.). 
83 See generally Securities Act R.S.B.C. 1996, c, 418 (Can.); Wertpapierhan-
delsgesetz—WpHG [Securities Trading Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL I at 2708, last 
amended by Gesetz [G], June 22, 2011, BGBL I at 1126, art. 3, § 4(a) (Ger.), https:// 
www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Aufsichtsrecht/Gesetz/Wp 
HG_en.html [https://perma.cc/WUS8-JN9X]; B.C. SEC. COMM’N, supra note 70.   
84 See, e.g., Wertpapierhandelsgesetz—WpHG [Securities Trading Act], Sept. 9, 
1998, BGBL I at 2708, last amended by Gesetz [G], June 22, 2011, BGBL I at 
1126, art. 3, § 4(a) (Ger.), https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen 
/EN/Aufsichtsrecht/Gesetz/WpHG_en.html [https://perma.cc/WUS8-JN9X]. 
85 See generally id. 
86 INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE IMPACT OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY 9 (2011), http:// 
iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD361.pdf [https://perma.cc/42E9-X8NS]. 
87 Id. The same document defined “market efficiency” as “the ability of mar-
ket participants to transact business easily and at a price that reflects all avail-
able market information. Factors considered when determining if a market is 
efficient include liquidity, price discovery and transparency.” Id. See also a def-
inition given in 2006 by a task force set up the Canadian Investment Dealers 
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It is arguable then that markets which are “fair” also have “in-
tegrity,” and that this is what instils market confidence. Therefore, it 
could also be argued that any structural adjustments which enhance 
fairness also enhance integrity, which in turn enhances confidence in 
those markets. 
III. HOW HAVE MARKET INTEGRITY AND MARKET 
FAIRNESS BEEN DEFINED? 
The limited attention given to what constitutes market fair-
ness and market integrity in scholarly literature is consistent 
with the lack of regulatory definition.88 
Within the finance discipline, market integrity is often dis-
cussed but not often defined. When it is defined it tends to be de-
fined relatively narrowly, as a market where information is equal 
or a market free from insider trading and market manipulation.89 
For example, in 2000, Utpal Bhattacharya, Hazem Daouk, Brian 
Jorgenson, and Carl-Heinrich Kehr described market integrity as 
“the disadvantages outsiders face vis-a-vis insiders when trading 
in the market. We expect that market integrity changes over time.”90 
This definition was given in the context of an event study meas-
uring the incorporation of information into prices in a capital 
market where insider trading laws were not enforced.91 In 2006, 
Carole Comerton-Forde and James Rydge, in considering the 
                                                                                                            
Association of Canada to examine Canadian securities regulation: “Capital mar-
ket integrity can be thought of as a level of general confidence in the function-
ing of the market. Integrity is closely related to investors’ perception of the 
fairness of the markets.” TASKFORCE TO MODERNIZE SEC. LEGIS. IN CAN., 
CANADA STEPS UP 29 (2006), http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/Volume1_en.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2HSB-M22J]. 
88 See generally Securities Act R.S.C. 1996, c. 418 (Can.); Wertpapierhan-
delsgesetz—WpHG [Securities Trading Act], Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL I at 2708, last 
amended by Gesetz [G], June 22, 2011, BGBL I at 1126, art. 3, § 4(a) (Ger.), 
https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Aufsichtsrecht/Ge 
setz/WpHG_en.html [https://perma.cc/WUS8-JN9X]; B.C. SEC. COMM’N, supra 
note 70. 
89 But see Carole Comerton-Forde & James Rydge, Market Integrity and 
Surveillance Effort, 29 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 149, 149 (2006).  
90 Utpal Bhattacharya et al., When an Event is Not an Event: The Curious 
Case of an Emerging Market, 55 J. FIN. ECON. 69, 72 n.4 (2000). 
91 See id. at 69–70.  
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market microstructure of ten Asia-Pacific stock exchanges, de-
fined market integrity as “the ability of investors to transact in a 
fair and informed market where prices reflect information.”92 In 
2011, Donald Margotta stated that “[m]arket integrity exists 
when stock prices are set in a market free from misinformation.”93 
Such narrow definitions of market integrity conceptually link 
it to market efficiency, in that a market of high integrity should 
also be efficient because prices will reflect their fundamental 
value.94 To finance scholars, the influence of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Efficient Capital Market Hypoth-
esis (ECMH) leads to “a prediction that, in a[n] ‘informationally 
efficient’ market, prices will reflect as closely as possible the as-
set’s ‘fundamental value.’”95 If prices reflect an asset’s fundamen-
tal value, this will result in the most efficient allocation of capital, 
as investors will pay no more for securities than their inherent 
value.96 As such, market integrity seems to mean eliminating 
practices that may interfere with the ability of prices to reflect the 
asset’s fundamental value.97 If all material information in relation 
to a security has been publically disclosed, prices should reflect 
the asset’s fundamental value due to the incorporation of all this 
information.98 
                                                                                                            
92 Carole Comerton-Forde & James Rydge, The Current State of Asia-Pacific 
Stock Exchanges: A Critical Review of Market Design, 14 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. 
1, 2 (2006). 
93  Donald Margotta, Market Integrity, Market Efficiency, Market Accuracy, 
17 BUS. REV., CAMBRIDGE 14, 14 (2011). 
94 See generally Bhattacharya et al., supra note 90; Comerton-Forde & 
Rydge, supra note 92; Margotta, supra note 93.  
95 EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, THE MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF MARKET ABUSE, 
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 53 (2005). 
96 See id.   
97 See generally id.  
98 Using CAPM and ECMH, finance academics construct “event” studies: 
the difference between the price of a security that has been the subject of an 
abnormal occurrence and what it would have been without such an event. Id. 
For example, as insider dealing is illegal, in theory prices before significant 
announcements should reflect their fundamental value incorporating all pub-
lically available information. After the announcement, the prices should almost 
immediately reflect their fundamental value by incorporating this new infor-
mation. Id. at 53–54. If price movements are “abnormal” before significant an-
nouncements, this may be an indication of insider trading. Id. at 54. 
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Michael Aitken has defined market integrity, in part, as “the 
extent to which market participants engage in prohibited trading 
behaviors.”99 Taking this further he and the Capital Markets Co-
operative Research Centre have designed empirical proxies and 
systems to assist regulators in measuring the impact of their ac-
tivities on market integrity, but only to the extent to which the 
regulators’ activities impact upon the level of three types of pro-
hibited behaviours in the markets they supervise: market manip-
ulation, insider trading, and broker-agency conflict in the form of 
front running.100 
Behavioural finance academics Hersh Shefrin and Meir Statman 
also attempted to define fairness in the context of financial mar-
kets.101 While stating that it could be defined narrowly as equal 
access to information relevant to asset valuation, they developed 
a much broader definition by incorporating a claim to entitle-
ments.102 Shefrin and Statman identified seven types of entitle-
ments that they state form the basis of these entitlement claims. 
These are: 
(1) freedom from coercion (people enter transactions 
voluntarily and are not coerced into or prevented from 
entering transactions); 
(2) freedom from misrepresentation (people are entitled 
to rely on information which is disclosed); 
                                                                                                            
99 Frederick H. deB. Harris et al., Evidence-Based Regulatory Policy Making 
for Financial Markets: A Panel Discussion of a Proposed Framework for As-
sessing Market Quality, J. TRADING, 69, 71 (2011). 
100 Id. at 69–70. See generally CAPITAL MKTS. COOP. RES. CTR., (Aug. 27, 
2016, 10:05 PM), http://www.cmcrc.com/development/finance-tools [https://perma 
.cc/CR9G-384J]; SMARTS Trade Surveillance for the Sell-Side, NASDAQ (Aug. 27, 
2016, 10:11 PM), http://business.nasdaq.com/market-tech/market-participants 
/SMARTS-trade-surveillance-sell-side [https://perma.cc/M3SL-PHEB]; B-NEXT 
(Aug. 26, 2016, 10:21 PM), https://www.b-next.com/about/references [https://perma 
.cc/SEM3-L64P] (noting that some commercial corporations provide surveillance 
systems to regulators, securities markets, and self-regulatory organizations, 
such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the Invest-
ment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IRROC), to monitor the 
securities markets for market abuse). 
101 See generally Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, Ethics, Fairness and Effi-
ciency in Financial Markets, 49 FIN. ANALYSTS J., 21 (Nov./Dec. 1993).  
102 Id. at 21–22.  
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(3) information (people are entitled to equal access to a 
particular set of information); 
(4) equal processing power (people are entitled to a “com-
petency floor” of information-processing skills, requiring 
either compulsory disclosures or prohibition on infor-
mation that may be misinterpreted); 
(5) freedom from impulse (people are protected from 
possible imperfect decisions); 
(6) efficient prices (people are entitled to prices that 
they perceive to be efficient in that intervention is per-
mitted to correct imbalances); and 
(7) equal bargaining power (people have equal power in 
negotiations leading to transactions).103 
 
Although not entirely clear, it appears that the source of Shefrin 
and Statman’s entitlement claims were based on adopting a de-
ontological view of rights as intrinsic and fundamental.104 This is 
in contrast to a utilitarian view of rights as being derived from 
that which results from the optimal overall welfare across indi-
viduals in society.105 
This uncoupling of market fairness and market integrity from 
market efficiency and the efficient capital market hypothesis is 
more pronounced in a definition of fairness developed by Ian Lee, 
a legal academic.106 His emphasis is on a much broader definition, 
independent of any issues of economic efficiency.107 Lee elucidates 
the meaning of fairness in the context of the securities market, 
although his focus in developing a definition is on justifying the 
prohibition against insider trading.108 Lee sees fairness as: 
[A] brake upon self-interest. It is the normative basis for a va-
riety of social conventions that prevent individuals from doing 
                                                                                                            
103 Id. at 23. 
104 See id. at 22. 
105 Id; see also James J. Angel & Douglas McCabe, Fairness in Financial 
Markets: The Case of High Frequency Trading, 112 J. BUS. ETHICS 585, 592–93 
(2013) (noting Shefrin and Statman’s fairness definition has been used in con-
sidering high frequency trading). 
106 See Lee, supra note 13, at 141. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 140. 
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that which would otherwise be in their own respective interest. 
Some conventions that could be grounded in fairness might in-
clude promise-keeping and truthfulness, which many people feel 
obligated to observe even where they might gain through deceit.109 
Like Shefrin and Statman, Lee suggests that the normative 
force of fairness may come from a deontological obligation to treat 
others as equals.110 Alternatively, from the point of view of utili-
tarian and other consequentialists, the normative force of fairness 
is a condition for the possibility of welfare-improving cooperative 
action as a solution to the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma.111 
Lee postulates that the content of fairness will depend upon 
the context in which it is used and argues that a market which is 
attractive to engage in is that which contains an internal morality 
characterized by fair ground rules.112 This is because markets are 
cooperative institutions whereby resources are reallocated through 
voluntary exchange, with the market respecting individual pref-
erences and individual choice.113 Fairness-related rules are nec-
essary for the market to be one which is faithful to its vocation as 
a means of cooperative interaction and, as such, they must respect 
neutrality and autonomy for all.114 Lee suggests that fairness re-
quires rules which operate against coercion, deception, and dis-
honesty, and rules requiring those who have made promises to 
keep them.115 Furthermore, Lee suggests that a fair market re-
quires parity of information on the basis that exploiting a party’s 
informational disadvantage is inconsistent with respect for an-
other’s autonomy.116 
IV. SOME KEY FEATURES OF MARKET INTEGRITY AND 
MARKET FAIRNESS 
It seems that the concepts of market integrity and market fair-
ness may be equivalent. Both seem to require a level playing 
                                                                                                            
109 Id. at 141. 
110 Id. at 142. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 142–43. 
114 Id. at 146–47. 
115 Id. at 147. 
116 Id. at 150. 
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field.117 Both are justified largely by referring to the need to main-
tain confidence and trust in the markets.118 As one of the main 
ways in which capital resources are allocated within an economy, 
the securities markets are critical to a nation as a whole.119 There-
fore, it can be argued that trust and confidence in the markets is 
critical to the welfare of a given nation. One of the key ways in 
which securities regulators and securities regulation maintain 
such confidence is to ensure that the markets are, or are at least 
perceived to be, of high integrity or fair by market participants 
and the public at large.120 
What then is incorporated within the securities regulators’ re-
sponsibility to maintain market integrity and market fairness? 
Whether or not these concepts are described as normative, it seems 
clear that contained within them are some core components. Clearly, 
it requires the elimination of market abuse practices whereby one 
person has a discriminatory informational advantage over an-
other.121 As such, securities regulation and securities regulators 
must work towards eliminating market abuse practices, such as 
insider trading, market manipulation, and front running. Elimi-
nating market abuse can also be justified on utilitarian and effi-
ciency grounds, as such practices interfere with the accuracy of 
the prices of securities.122 
                                                                                                            
117 Kristen A. Truver, Note, Cutting the Party Line: How the SEC Can Silence 
Persisting Phone Call Tips, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 448–49 (2010). 
118 See generally Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, Trusting the 
Stock Market, 63 J. FIN. 2557 (2008) (finding that trust, defined as the subjec-
tive probability individuals attribute to the possibility of being cheated, had a 
positive and large effect on stock market participation as well as on the share 
of an individual’s wealth invested in stocks. Also finding that cultural differ-
ences impacted the level of trust). 
119 Carlyle H. Dauenhauer, Note, Justice in Equity: Newman and Egalitarian 
Reconciliation for Insider-Trading Theory, 12 RUTGERS BUS. L. J. 41, 48 (2015). 
120 James Harlan Koenig, Comment, The Basics of Disclosure: The Market for 
Information in the Market for Corporate Control, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1021, 1059 
(1989); see also Philip J. McConnaughay, The Scope of Autonomy in Interna-
tional Contracts and Its Relation to Economic Regulation and Development, 39 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 595, 647 (2001). 
121 Bruce W. Klaw, Why Now is the Time to Statutorily Ban Insider Trading 
Under the Equality of Access Theory, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 275, 333 
(2016); see also Austin, supra note 21, at 28.  
122 Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 
184–85 (2010). 
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However, it also seems that market fairness and market integ-
rity incorporate ideas that are broader than just the elimination of 
market abuse.123 As such, any definition of market integrity and 
market fairness that is limited to the elimination of market abuse 
or ensuring equal access to information is arguably too narrow. 
The elimination of market abuse was one of the original justifica-
tions behind the introduction of the Exchange Act in 1934, but it 
was not the only justification.124 As the Exchange Act states, the 
markets are imbued with “a national public interest” requiring 
the intervention of a government regulatory agency in the form of 
the SEC.125 Furthermore, the powers granted to the SEC to regu-
late the markets were much broader than just enhancing disclo-
sure and preventing market abuse.126 The original Act gave the 
SEC powers such as setting the rules of procedure of exchanges 
and the ability to suspend trading of securities.127 Over the years, 
the powers of the SEC under this Act have been significantly ex-
panded to include, inter alia, the regulation of tender offers and 
clearance and settlement procedures.128 
In keeping with this national public interest, it seems that 
there is an argument that there are intrinsic rights from both the 
perspective of individuals and the public that the securities mar-
kets will be fair if the public is able to access these markets, and 
participants in the market will be treated as equals. This requires 
that there be nondiscriminatory equal access to the markets for 
all those wishing to trade.129 It also requires that markets be free 
from coercion and that regulators facilitate the ability of all mar-
ket participants to be able to trade their securities easily and at 
the same cost.130 
To ensure such equality there must also be transparency in 
terms of the price of securities for everyone, which would include 
                                                                                                            
123 Roberta S. Karmel, IOSCO’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 37 J. CORP. 
L. 849, 897 (2012). 
124 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, §§ 1–2, 48 Stat. 881, 
881–82 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934)). 
125 Id. § 2.   
126 See id. § 19. 
127 Id. 
128 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 62, at 227.  
129 Patrick O. Gudridge, The Persistence of Classical Style, 131 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 663, 691 (1983). 
130 Lee, supra note 13, at 149. 
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pre-trade information such as the prices at which securities have 
traded, as well as the depth of demand and supply at each price.131 
This need for transparency of pricing information suggests that 
regulators resist markets for securities, such as “dark pools,” which 
limit transparency and discriminate between traders in relation 
to pre-trade information.132 Ensuring full transparency would ensure 
that prices are accurate.133 This may also require that securities 
regulators intervene if an event disrupts the accuracy of prices as 
occurred, for example, during the flash crash of 2010.134 
Ensuring equality of treatment requires that all participants 
have free access, at exactly the same time, to accurate information 
from issuers from which the value of securities can be determined.135 
This would require periodic filings as well as information, which 
would materially impact price.136 
Protecting market fairness and market integrity by ensuring 
equality does not seem to require “freedom from impulse,” as sug-
gested by Shefrin and Statman, in that securities regulators protect 
                                                                                                            
131 Nicholas Crudele, Note, Dark Pool Regulation: Fostering Innovation and 
Competition While Protecting Investors, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. COM. L. 569, 
579 (2015).  
132 Id. “Dark Pools” are execution facilities where orders are entered but 
there is limited order information displayed to some or all market participants. 
See generally CFA INST. PUBL’NS, DARK POOLS AND INTERNALIZATION, AND EQUITY 
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in Connection with the 2010 ‘Flash Crash,’ BUS. INSIDER, (Apr. 21, 2015), http:// 
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SEATTLE L. REV. 325, 329 (2011). But see Aden R. Pavkov, Ghouls and Godsends? 
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people from possible imperfect decisions.137 Whilst securities reg-
ulators may be justified in regulating in order to protect unsophis-
ticated investors from investing in particular securities, this power 
is derived from another goal of regulators, investor protection, rather 
than the goal of ensuring market integrity and market fairness.138 
Nor does market integrity and market fairness require regulators 
to work towards enhancing liquidity or reducing transaction costs.139 
Again, such regulations may be desirable but would be classified 
as those that enhance another goal of securities regulation, namely 
market efficiency.140 
CONCLUSION 
It could be argued that the concepts of market fairness and 
market integrity have been used by securities regulators for too 
long without sufficient analysis of what these concepts actually 
require, while at the same time, without sufficiently distinguishing 
them from other key goals such as market efficiency and investor 
protection. Although such a stance may give regulators maximum 
flexibility to deal with what they perceive as challenges when they 
arise, this also gives rise to issues in terms of measuring regulators’ 
effectiveness as well as exposing them to allegations of excessive 
use of their powers. 
Whilst it may not be possible to definitively set out once and 
for all what is encompassed by these concepts, it appears that at 
their core is a requirement that securities regulators enhance the 
ability of all participants to access the markets and to ensure that 
participants in the market are treated as equals. As such, it seems 
that market fairness and market integrity require: 
(1) the elimination of market abuse activities, which are 
behaviours whereby one person takes advantage of his 
                                                                                                            
137 See Mark Klock, The SEC’s New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of 
Market Fragmentation Ahead of Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 FLA. L. 
REV. 753, 789 (1999). 
138 See S.M. Solaiman, The Enron Collapse and Criminal Liabilities of Audi-
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or her position to gain an unmerited advantage over an-
other; this includes insider trading, market manipulation, 
and front running; 
(2) non-discriminatory access to the market for all those 
wishing to participate; 
(3) transparent and accurate information about the prices 
of securities available to all participants at the same 
time; and 
(4) accurate information about issuers of securities 
available to all participants at the same time. 
Of course, market fairness/market integrity is just one of the 
core goals of securities regulators. Regulators are required to bal-
ance this with their other objectives, namely investor protection, 
market efficiency, and the reduction of systemic risk. This may 
require trade-offs, and as such, market integrity and market fair-
ness concerns may need to yield to these other goals. However, to 
ensure a proper balance is made, a clear delineation is required 
between each of the goals as well as a clear definition as to what 
each of these goals encompass. Furthermore, to properly measure 
changes and proposed developments and to be able to properly 
assess and balance these goals, a range of metrics should be devel-
oped that is applicable to each. Significant progress has been made 
in measuring changes in market efficiency. Some progress has 
been made, and is continuing to be made, to measure changes in 
market fairness and market integrity in terms of the level of mar-
ket abuse. However, metrics also need to be developed to ensure that 
the other components of market fairness and market integrity, as 
set out in this Article, are also properly assessed by securities reg-
ulators in the exercise of their functions. 
 
